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This paper analyses participation in farming by non-
agricultural corporations. I discuss the limitations of 
different modes of entry, arguing that the phenomenon 
is XQOiNHO\ WR cRQWUiEXWH siJQiﬁcaQWO\ WR aJUicXOWXUaO RU 
rural development. 
InUSoEucUion
Corporate access to farmland in Japan has long 
been restricted by law, but has gradually expanded 
through successive deregulations since the early 
2000s. The Farmland Act (nōchihō) of 1952 posed 
stringent requirements on the ownership of farmland. 
The general principle was that only farmers should 
be entitled to own farmland in order to prevent land 
speculation and the resurrection of the pre-war landlord 
system. The entry of general (i.e. non-agricultural) 
companies into farming in particular raised concerns 
that corporate management would not be in harmony 
with that of family farms and might compromise the 
regional utilisation of farmland and water (ľnaka and 
Ando, 2014: 15). The policy shift that has occurred 
since the early 2000s was justified by appealing to 
the rapid shrinkage of the farming population, the 
growing amount of abandoned farmland, and the 
consequent need to expand the pool of “bearers” 
(ninaite) of Japanese agriculture. As Yamashita (2008: 
3) puts it, “joint-stock companies will not necessarily 
succeed in farm management, but why should they 
not be regarded as potential successors to Japanese 
farms?” Entrepreneurial, corporate agriculture is 
one the slogans of the current prime minister Shinzo 
Abe, and part of a rhetoric depicting agriculture as a 
new growth-leading industry. Over the last decade a 
growing number of companies from various sectors 
established new farming ventures nationwide, but 
overall their achievements fell short of expectations. 
Why is corporate agriculture unsuccessful despite the 
welcoming governmental atmosphere? This paper 
is based on a review of existing literature and on 
interviews with representatives of general companies 
participating in agriculture, farmers, and members of 
Japan’s National Chamber of Agriculture. 
MoEes oG enUSZ
Since the early 2000s, entry of general corporations in 
agriculture has been promoted in two ways: by relaxing 
restrictions to their participation in Agricultural 
Production Corporations (nōgyō seisan hōjin) and by 
allowing the direct lease of farmland. Agricultural 
PURGXcWiRQ &RUSRUaWiRQs AP&s ZHUH ﬁUsW iQWURGXcHG 
in the legislation in 1962 as the only legal persons 
allowed to own farmland. APCs were established to 
allow companies operating in food-related business 
to engage in farming operations under strict rules, but 
have long played a minor role in Japanese agriculture. 
Only in 2001, following a revision of the Farmland 
Act, general corporations were allowed to participate in 
APCs, with total corporate shares restricted to 25％ of 
the total capital and individual shares limited to 10％. 
Another revision of the Farmland Act in 2009 allowed 
individual corporate shares up to 25％ and a successive 
amendment in 2015 (enforced from 2017) up to 50％. 
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The number of general corporations investing in 
APCs has arguably increased following successive 
deregulations, but there are currently no statistics 
available. However, statistics released by the MAFF 
on incorporated joint-stock APCs (which also includes 
incorporated family farms) show that between 2001 and 
2017 their number reached 5,445 units (MAFF, 2018a).  
7KH OHasH RI IaUPOaQG E\ JHQHUaO cRUSRUaWiRQs Zas ﬁUsW 
introduced in 2002 as an experimental case in special 
structural reformation districts, limiting farmland 
available for lease to fields left idle (Godo, 2014). 
The scheme was extended nationwide in 2005, and 
in 2009 the restriction on abandoned farmland was 
removed, allowing general corporations to lease any 
plot of farmland nationwide directly from landowners. 
Under the early lease system, centred on the reclaiming 
of abandoned farmland, lots available for lease were 
iGHQWiﬁHG E\ ORcaO aXWKRUiWiHs aQG ORcaO cRPSaQiHs sXcK 
as construction companies and food manufacturers were 
the majority (OECD, 2009: 77). However, especially 
following the institution of Farmland Banks1） (nōchi 
chūkan kanri kikō) in 2014, the role of local authorities 
as mediators has been partly reduced. There are three 
major requirements for general corporations adopting 
this scheme: farmland must be used exclusively for 
agricultural purposes, the management must share the 
responsibility of collective works in rural areas, and 
1） Administrative bodies instituted on a prefectural base managing farmland under unconditional authority.
at least one executive officer of the corporation must 
be engaged in farming on a full-time basis (MAFF, 
2018d). Details concerning the arrangements between 
leaser and landlord are regulated on a contractual base. 
5he leBse sZsUeN
Compared with the restrictions and the legal hurdles 
involved in the establishment of (or participation in) 
an APC, the lease system is quite straightforward. 
Although only APCs are allowed to own farmland, the 
purchase of farmland is often prohibitive and general 
companies prefer leasing arrangements regardless 
(Muroya, 2013). Between 2003 and 2017, 1,904 joint-
stock companies, 748 NPOs, and 378 limited-liability 
companies leased farmland under the lease system 
(MAFF, 2018b). 
 
New entrants come from a variety of sectors. 
In contrast to the previous lease system, where 
construction companies were the majority, currently 
they only represent 11％. Agriculture/livestock 
companies and food-related companies (processors, 
wholesalers, retailers) account respectively for 21％ 
and 24％ of the total. Manufacturers represent 4％ 
and general wholesalers/retailers 5％. Educational, 
medical, and welfare-related companies account for 
4％. NPOs (any non-profit organization including 
－ 61 －
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public administrations, educational and medical 
institutions) account for 9％ while the remaining 21％ 
includes companies operating in the service industry, 
local administrations, and waste collectors, among 
others (MAFF, 2018b). Vegetables represent the most 
widespread produce accounting for 41％ of the total. 
Vegetables can be harvested soon after singing a leasing 
contract and generally do not require high technical 
knowledge or investments. Grains (rice, wheat, beans, 
etc.) only account for 18％. This is unsurprising 
cRQsiGHUiQJ WKaW OaQGiQWHQsiYH cURSs aUH RQO\ SURﬁWaEOH 
when farmed on vast areas, which are typically 
precluded to external investors. Local construction 
companies, whose employees are often part-time rice 
farmers, most likely represent the majority share of 
rice farming, together with Japanese wine brewers and 
local municipalities (Ōnaka and Ando, 2014). New 
farms are established all over Japan, with a higher 
concentration in semi-urban areas close to  major cities 
0A)) c 7KH WRS ﬁYH SUHIHcWXUHs E\ QXPEHU RI 
entries are Hyogo (185), Shizuoka (166), Nagano (143), 
Yamanashi (133), and Aichi (111). These areas are easy 
to access, well served by infrastructures, and better 
connected to market outlets. Corporate agriculture is 
by no means large-scale agriculture. The average size 
of farmland leased by new entrants is 2.9 hectares,2） 
and 58％ of all farms are less than 1 hectare (MAFF, 
2018b). 
According to a survey conducted in 2013 by the Japan 
Finance Corporation (JFC, 2013) on 138 companies 
entering agriculture under the lease system, only 30％ 
of them operated on a budget surplus. Wholesalers and 
retailers were the most successful (58％), followed by 
food processors (35％) and construction companies 
(23％). Only 13％ of companies from the remaining 
sectors showed a positive budget. There are numerous 
cases of large companies that withdrew from farming 
RSHUaWiRQs EHcaXsH RI ﬁQaQciaO ORssHs 0XUR\a  
Hasegawa, 2016). Two notable examples are Uniqlo 
and Omron. 
2） The average farm size in Japan is 2.46 hectares (MAFF, 2016).
%isBEWBnUBHes oG HeneSBl coNQBnies 
Smallholdings constitute the core of Japanese 
agriculture. Compared to family farms, corporate farms 
display few strengths, several weaknesses, and many 
similar problems. Common problems are certainly the 
PRsW siJQiﬁcaQW 7KHsH aUH iQ WXUQ WKH NH\ SUREOHPs RI 
Japanese agriculture at large: land fragmentation and 
high production costs (i.e. labour). Securing a reliable, 
profitable market outlet also represents a widespread 
problem among new entrants. In particular,  companies 
unrelated to food business often report difficulties in 
marketing their products (JFC, 2013). Although it is 
theoretically possible to argue that large companies can 
EHQHﬁW IURP WKHiU H[SHUWisH aQG PaQaJHPHQW NQRZKRZ 
(for instance in the organization of human resources, 
the standardization of production processes, investment 
planning, logistics, etc.), these strengths only play 
a marginal role in the typical setting in which most 
farming ventures operate: small, fragmented farms. 
The most significant advantage of large corporations 
is arguably represented by their financial resources: 
investment and working capital. Cover capital is also 
important to assure that  farms can continue to operate 
GHsSiWH SURORQJHG GHﬁciW 0XUR\a  7Kis is iQGHHG 
a quite common circumstance: of the few companies 
that achieve a budget surplus, only a minority do so 
within the time originally planned (JFC, 2013). Even 
for Kagome, a large food manufacturer, it took over 10 
years to make its farming business profitable (Ishida, 
2015). 
Compared to small farming households, general 
companies encounter greater difficulties in acquiring 
farmland and farming know-how, as well as a stable, 
ﬁQaQciaOO\ YiaEOH OaERXU sXSSO\ )aUPOaQG WUaQsIHUs iQ 
Japan usually take the form of informal deals based 
on relationships of mutual trusts among members of 
the same cohort (Isaka, 2015). Rural landlords are 
generally reluctant to entrust farmland to outsiders of 
the community and are often sceptical about entrusting 
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newcomers with the responsibility of shared works 
and farmland preservation. Because outsiders are not 
bound to the community by kinship relations or other 
social obligations, they must first demonstrate their 
commitment and slowly earn trust. Large companies in 
particular can be seen as impersonal, dubious entities. 
Members of rural communities fear that new entrants 
might carelessly withdraw from operations overnight or 
be inconsiderate in their farm management, for instance, 
by depleting soil fertility and damaging neighbouring 
ﬁHOGs WKURXJK iPSURSHU XsH RI IHUWiOi]HUs aQG SHsWiciGHs 
These concerns are not entirely baseless, as cases have 
been reported of companies suddenly withdrawing 
from farming operations as well as cases of reckless 
behaviour (Godo, 2012: 85). One of the farmers 
interviewed mentioned the case of a construction 
company that  obtained farmland from a local 
municipality but soon withdrew after extracting gravel 
from it, irremediably compromising the soil quality. 
The establishment of good relations with the farming 
community is paramount in order to guarantee the 
success of new farming ventures, for instance, to ensure 
that leasing contracts are renewed and that further (and 
better) plots of land will be made available. Not only 
new entrants participate in communal activities such 
as the maintenance of waterways and the organization 
of local festivals, but interviews with company 
representatives revealed that fertilizers, pesticides, 
and farming appliances were mostly purchased from 
local cooperatives despite cheaper options available. 
Cost efficiency in input procurement, supposedly 
another strength of general corporations, is therefore 
subordinated to the establishment of good relations with 
the farming community. Farmland accessed by general 
corporations through the lease system often constitutes 
RI ﬁHOGs OHIW iGOH RU RI ORZ aJUicXOWXUaO YaOXH iUUHJXOaU 
small, or isolated plots often of poor soil quality). New 
entrants thus have to deal with problems related to soil 
improvement. It usually takes between one and two 
years to prepare a field for the beginning of farming 
3） Interview with company representative (restaurant chain), January 2017.
4） Interview with company representative (food retailer), January 2017.
(Muroya, 2013). One of the company representatives 
interviewed described the problems encountered in the 
establishment of a new farm: 
‘We  w a n t e d  t o  b u i l d  a  t o m a t o 
greenhouse in a mountainous area 
of Kumamoto Prefecture. The field 
was in terrible conditions but the 
local government said it  was our 
responsibility to restore it. We spent 
about 2.5 million yen, but at least this 
helped to improve our reputation among 
local residents. They thought that we 
were serious about agriculture and this 
was the beginning of good relations 
with them’3）
Together with constraints limiting access to farmland, 
new entrants must also deal with problems related to 
securing workforce. Labour shortage is a widespread 
problem in Japanese agriculture and company 
representatives interviewed emphasized that they face 
GiIﬁcXOWiHs ﬁQGiQJ ZRUNHUs GXUiQJ WKH KaUYHsW sHasRQ 
Seasonal workforce mainly constitutes of a mix of part-
time workers, retirees, and trainees. 
You can’t find people to harvest all at 
once. There’s a limit to overtime work 
you can ask of employees. So instead of 
having farms specialized in one or two 
products we have to cultivate different 
crops. In this way we can divide the 
harvest in different stages and manage 
it with fewer people. Of course this 
UHGXcHs HIﬁciHQc\4）
Together with securing seasonal workforce, the high 
cost of labour represents another weakness of general 
corporations participating in agriculture (Ishida, 2015). 
This is especially true for companies relying heavily 
－ 63 －
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on regular employees. Unlike family farms, whereby 
most of the workforce constitutes of family members, 
companies must pay yearly salaries and benefits to 
their employees. As previously mentioned, general 
corporations can engage in farming either through 
participation in an APC, or through the lease system. 
Especially when operating under the lease system, 
different companies choose to rely to a lesser or 
greater extent on company employees or local partners 
(farmers) for their operations. In most cases, under the 
label of direct farming, companies engage de facto in 
contract farming. This mode of entry presents several 
advantages including lower costs, better access to 
farmland, and lower risk of early mistakes determined 
by the lack of farming expertise. On the other hand, a 
minority of companies rely more heavily on company 
employees in order to achieve greater autonomy 
from local partners and to secure the continuity of 
farming knowhow within the company. The choice of 
whether to invest in an APC or use the lease system 
depends on the above considerations as well as on the 
availability of local partners with which to team up in 
the establishment of an APC. Two of the companies 
included in this study (a large restaurant chain and a 
large food retailer) were at the same time participating 
in various APCs and leasing farmland through the lease 
system. Both companies were relying highly  on local 
farmers for their operations. On the contrary, another 
company (another large food retailer) was mostly 
relying on regular employees exclusively leasing 
farmland in different parts of Japan. 
$onclusions
General corporations engage in farming operations in 
a variety of fashions and for different reasons, but are 
generally at a disadvantage when compared to family 
farms or local agricultural corporations. In spite of 
that, while not particularly successful, why should 
general corporations not be regarded as legitimate 
contributors to agricultural and rural development? 
As small as any contribution can be, the creation of 
new job opportunities is a welcome occurrence for 
the rural economy. However, as demonstrated by the 
concentration of new entrants in areas near major cities, 
it appears clear that rural development is not a priority 
for general companies, and that any contribution 
will occur on their terms. Moreover, as Jentzsch 
(2016) points out, while local public corporations and 
agricultural cooperatives might be willing to farm 
unattractive plots of land as a form of community 
service, this cannot be expected from external investors. 
Finally, together with that of appropriate farmland use, 
another crucial issue is represented by employment 
policies adopted by new entrants, and whether they will 
offer decent working conditions to local employees 
or mostly provide low-pay part-time jobs (Hisano 
and Sekine, 2009). In the case of large companies 
investing in agriculture as a form of corporate social 
responsibility or as a marketing strategy, management 
practices are likely to be in line with the expectations 
of the rural community. As for food-related companies 
investing in order to profit from the procurement 
of raw materials as well as companies participating 
in agriculture to absorb their redundant workforce 
(e.g. construction companies), not unlike any other 
farm or agricultural corporation, only the punctual 
implementation of regulations by local authorities 
will ensure the adoption of appropriate management 
practices. 
BiClioHSBQhZ
Godo, Y. (2012). Nihon Nōgyō He No Tadashii Zetsubō (The 
Right Way To Despair About Japanese Agriculture). 
Tokyo: ShinchĿsha.
Godo, Y. (2014). Non-Agricultural Companies’ Entry into the 
Agricultural Industry in Japan. FFTC Agricultural Policy 
Platform. Retrieved from http://ap.fftc.agnet.org/ap_
db.php?id=192&print=1
Hasegawa, M. (2016). Susoya ga hirogaru nōgyō bun᾽ya e 
kigyō san᾽nyū (Participation in the expanding field of 
agriculture). Kabushikigaisha Asahi Risāchi Sentā No. 72. 
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